Programme  OS6a Economic instruments  abstract 596

Can water pricing policies regulate irrigation use?

Author(s): François Molle
François Molle Institut de Recherche pour le Développement 911, Avenue Agropolis BP 64501 34394 Montpellier Cedex 5 France molle@mpl.ird.fr

Keyword(s): water pricing, economic instruments, water policy, quota, efficiency

Article: abs596_article.pdf
Poster:
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Session: OS6a Economic instruments
AbstractThe paper proposes a review of

situations where water is scarce and where irrigation schemes are able to distribute water volumetrically, either at the

bulk or individual level. Such situations are relatively rare at the world level but they provide the context where

volumetric pricing policies can be implemented and can demonstrate their potential for putting demand and use in line

with supply. The review provides clear evidence that, instead of administered prices quotas, are almost invariably

chosen as the main regulation mechanism. In contrast with the large theoretical literature that has promoted price-

based regulation as a key instrument of water demand management, it appears that prices were mostly used to

regulate use at the margin, beyond the quota, rather than for rationing scarce water. This is certainly an important role

but one that falls short of efficiency pricing and remains limited to those relatively rare schemes where water is

supplied volumetrically, on–demand or on arranged demand.
The paper then reviews the advantages and

limitations of quotas and attempts to explain why they are systematically preferred to pure price-based regulation. If

made tradable, quotas or entitlements can be more easily reallocated among users according to criteria of economic

efficiency. Such situations still remain rare because there are several cultural, technical and institutional constraints to

their development, most notably in developing countries.
Finally the paper expands its conclusions to irrigation in

general and shows that although much hope has been vested in pricing mechanisms for regulating water use their

potential is much lower than is commonly believed.

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