



**Towards consistency  
of value and order:  
cooperation  
strategies of  
international water  
projects**

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2023. 9. 13

01

Conflicts and risks

02

Case analysis

03

Finding: A two-track  
conceptual model

04

Conclusion

# 1 Conflicts and risks: Why do countries refuse to cooperate in water?

Q1

## Why do countries refuse to cooperate regarding water issues?

Cause 1  
Conflicts

### Misunderstanding

countries involved in water resources project investors and recipients, governments and citizens

- a lack of **information** and knowledge
- conflicting **values and interests**
- **attitudes/intentions** - of the counterpart countries and institutions
- **bad effects** of past joint projects

### excludability of public goods

the marginal gains of individual beneficiaries fall quickly while free-riding beneficiaries increase, thus the game ends with zero contribution from each beneficiary.




### Zero-sum game of transboundary water resources

(prisoners' dilemma game)

Jervis, 1978; Schelling, 1960; Stein, 1980)

### a lack of commitment and trust

The Nile's path and the location of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam



**disputes over the water rights of the Nile dam** and the dam project have been a cause of disagreement between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia since colonial times



Cause 2

Risks

# 1 Conflicts and risks: Why do countries refuse to cooperate in water?

Q1

## Why do countries refuse to cooperate regarding water issues?

heterogeneity of individual countries, as values, laws, ideologies, etc.

Cause 1

Conflicts

### Political risks

- the capacity and knowledge of decision-makers aiming at minimizing the loss of interests and sovereignty, and maximizing access to water resources; losing negotiating power
- the need of support of citizens

Cause 2

Risks

### Security risks

- local: water scarcity
  - national and international: interaction of natural physical cycle and state actions and decisions
- political uncertainty, economic fragility, and geopolitical security crises

### Investment risks

- less developed regions, easy to fail the joint cooperation projects
- joint operation of fisheries, hydro-power and flood control requires more effective cross-border cooperation
- ongoing dynamic uncertainties
- climate change, continued population growth, ecosystem degradation, demand for non\_fossil fuel energy and ageing infrastructure

Global water security - extra environ issue to regions

- **political tension** or **instability** rather than actual acts of war
- the use of water as an instrument, target or victim of armed conflicts (De Stefano et al., 2010)



# 1 Conflicts and risks: Why do countries refuse to cooperate in water?

Q2

## What caused water conflicts and risks?

### Interests

- of Individual countries
- of multiple actors

### Value

- Rationality V.S. Humanity
- Efficiency V.S. Equity

Misunderstanding

Zero-sum  
gaming

International  
water  
cooperation

### Risks

- Political risks
- Security risks
- Investment risks

### Order

- Global order
- Local order

### Culture

- Border countries
- Donor-recipient countries






# 1 Conflicts and risks: Why do countries refuse to cooperate in water?

## What caused water conflicts and risks?

### Logical framework of the causing path of the conflicts and risks

Q2



# 2 Case analysis

## Case selection and data sources

Beginning of aiding  
International organization/ country  
Funding/ODA scale

**A**



**THE WORLD BANK**  
IBRD · IDA

**World BankGroup**  
Since its founding in 1944  
International organization

2723 projects totalling  
\$332.23 billion()

**B**



**ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK**

**Asia Development Bank**  
Since the 1960s  
International organization

Total operations US\$20.5 billion;  
cofinancing including trust  
fund \$11.4 billion  
(2018-2022)

**C**



**AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP**

**African Development Bank Group**  
Since its founding in 1964  
International organization

Cumulative 6575 operations  
totalling \$ 175.75 billion  
(1967-2021) (African  
Development Bank, 2023)

- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)——Loan provision ( )
- International Development Association (IDA)—— Interest-free loans and grants
- International Finance Corporation (IFC)——Provide loans/investments without government guarantees to key private companies in member countries, esp. developing countries
- Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)——Guarantees to investors and lenders (political risk insurance and credit enhancement)

**D**




**European Union**

**European Union**  
Since 1990s  
International organization

\$56.2 billion (2014–20);  
\$19.1 billion (2021)


**E**



**America**  
Since 1940s  
Major developed country

Cumulative totalling  
\$136.98 billion (2014–20),  
with about \$20 billion  
annually (USAID 2021a)

**F**




**Japan**  
Since 1954  
Major developed country

Cumulative totalling  
\$1783.9 billion(JICA,2023)

Beginning of aiding  
International organization/ country  
Funding/ODA scale

## 2 Case analysis

### Logic framework



Logic of international water cooperation strategies against conflicts and risks




## 2 Case analysis

Q3

What have IOs and major developed countries been doing?

Comparison of the six cases:  
**Cooperation method and type of input**

1) main regions



## 2 Case analysis

### Comparison of the six cases: **Cooperation method and type of input**

### 2) contents

W  
B  
D

- 1) Integrated water treatment for water supply, sanitation,
- 2) water resource management,
- 3) agricultural water use.

E  
U

- Aiding for water-related infrastructure construction,
- focusing on concept implantation and mechanism building.

A  
D  
B

- 1) Rural water: water and sanitation and irrigation and drainage;
- 2) Urban water: water supply, sanitation and waste management;
- 3) Basin water: infrastructure and multi-purpose water regulation and management of hydro-power facilities, integrated water resources and rivers health.

U  
S

- Aiding for the development of water-related infrastructure
- in which the assistance emphasizes technology and regulations output.

A  
F  
D  
B

- 1) construction of urban and suburban water supply and sanitation facilities;
- 2) integrated water resources management;
- 3) interventions in rural water supply and sanitation

J  
P

- 1) water resources development and water recycling utilization;
- 2) technical cooperation of local governments in the waterway industry;
- 3) seawater desalination, river bank protection, natural water circulation treatment, etc.

## 2 Case analysis

### Comparison of the six cases: Cooperation method *and* type of input

### 3) Cooperation method

#### WDB

- 1) Direct loans and grants;
- 2) Loans/investments to private companies of member countries without government guarantees;
- 3) guarantees (political risk insurance and credit enhancement) to investors and lenders.

- 1) Expand multi-channel grants and participate in multilateral cooperation;
- 2) Direct investment and donation;
- 3) Lead financing and international cooperation.

#### ADB

#### AFDB

- 1) Financing projects, programs and studies in public and private sector;
- 2) financing non-project operations, including structural adjustment loans, policy reforms and advice and technical assistance;
- 3) debt reduction;
- 4) strengthening its position as African knowledge exchange hub.

### Level and type of input to cooperation

#### EU

- 1) Multi-participating water diplomatic harmony, i.e. sideburns or counselors, wisdom, international banks, NGOs, etc.;
- 2) promote the European model;
- 3) push forward the construction of international conventions and regulations;
- 4) establish a cooperation mechanism platform;
- 5) large-scale financial support to expand influence.

- 1) Assistance for the development of the recipient country;
- 2) Construction water affairs multi-disciplinary cooperation frame, transit assistance intervention district affairs;

#### US

#### Japan

JICA is the major technical assistance organization, by

- 1) investment assistance;
- 2) expertise and technology support and human resources development and training;
- 3) leading loans and collaboration;
- 4) public-private interaction and cooperation.

## 2 Case analysis

### Comparison of the six cases: Cooperation method *and* type of input

### 4) level and type of cooperation input

• **WBG**

Mainly hard input, with methodology influence

• **ABG**

Mainly hard input, with methodology influence

**AFDB** Mainly hard input, with methodology influence

### Hard input



**US** Hard input dominantly, supplemented by soft input of value, ideas and consent from other countries



### Both hard and soft input

**Japan** Both hard and soft input as dominant cooperative types, with a hard input mainly in technology, and a soft input mainly in ideas and consent of policy



### Soft Input


**AFDB** Hard input dominantly, supplemented by soft input

**EU** Both hard and soft input as dominant  
usl. a combination of the two



Q4

### Why these strategies work?



#### Reason 1

- **Hard input** of loans, project and technology aids, **to solve supply shortage of infrastructure and money**
- in area of Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, etc.
- help the utilization and development of water resources



#### Reason 2

- **Soft input** of good interactions among countries,
- consent actions, formed based on similar value and ideas.
- successful soft strategies lay a foundation for the hard input



### 3 Finding: A two-track conceptual model for sustainable water cooperation

Q5

How do these strategies work?

**Value of isomorphism**



**Order of symbiosis**


- to resolve conflicts by including factors such as consistency of ideas, diffusion of methodology (ideas, values), community participation (empowerment) and resource incentives (win-win interests)
- **When:**
  - the ambiguity of goals, and institutional changes (which of institutional isomorphism)
  - the centralization and dependency of water resources, technological uncertainty
  - increasing goal consistency against conflicts and efficiency, might still lay a foundation of value of isomorphism.

- to reduce risk, that is, to get rid of the disorder.
- includes diffusion of methodology (including process standardization),
- rule consistency, resource incentives (new rule construction), technical consistency (through technical assistance) and community participation (empowerment; localization).
- to focus on the coexistence of both local and global orders,
- as the similarities grow with the progress of international cooperation.

# 3 Finding: A two-track conceptual model for sustainable water cooperation

Q5

How do these strategies work?



## Consistency

- of ideas
- of rules
- of technology



## Community participation

- Empowerment.
- Localization.

## Methodology diffusion

- Diffusion of Ideas and value
- Process standardization




## Resource incentives

- Win-win interests
- Construction of new rules




### 3 Finding: A two-track conceptual model for sustainable water cooperation

#### Four core strategies of international water cooperation



# 4 Conclusion

- 1 Why do countries refuse to cooperate regarding water issues?
- 2 What caused water conflicts and risks?
- 3 What have IOs and major developed countries been doing to address them?
- 4 Why do they work?
- 5 How do they work well?



## Key Advices to Chinese international water cooperation

### Consistency

- effective communication and mutual understanding
- in **ideas** (culture, value, etc.), **rules** (treaties, laws, regulations, agreements, etc.), and **technology** (advanced in knowledge and technology)

### Methodology discussion

- **mitigates technical or process contradictions** caused by bad conduct of water projects
- investment or loans can be designed and implemented by a **good consent standardization**

### Community participation **bridge the gap**

- between local government and citizens, and between coordinators, donors and recipients
- **empower local community** by information disclosure and opportunities for local wisdom

### Resource incentives **as catalysts**

- by achieving **win-win interests** among international players
- make **new rules** that **optimize water resources decision-making**

➤ **Minimize potential conflicts + build trust**

➤ **mitigates contradictions + build standard**

➤ **bridge the gap + empower locals**

➤ **Use resources as catalysts than tools + make new rules**





# Thank you!

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