



WATER GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE CONTEXT OF INEQUALITY

SECURING RIGHTS or LEGITIMISING
DISPOSSESSION?

Helle Munk Ravnborg, DIIS, and Daniel Chillon Olmos, IXMATI
May 2015

*This research is conducted as part of the programme Territorial Cohesion for
Development, coordinated by Rimisp – Latin American Centre for Rural Development,
supported by IDRC, Canada, and Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)*



Legal & administrative water governance reform in Nicaragua (2007 →): Irrigation water rights



<i>Irrigation area</i>	<i>< 3 ha</i>	<i>3-20 ha</i>	<i>>20 ha</i>
Law 620	Authorisation by District	¿?	Concession by ANA
Regulation – 2007	Authorisation by District	Concession by Watershed Organisation	¿?
Regulation - 2010	<i>Criterion not used</i>		

<i>Farm size</i>	<i>< 3 ha</i>	<i>< 20 ha</i>	<i>20-70 ha</i>	<i>> 70 ha</i>
Law 620	<i>Criterion not used</i>			
Regulation – 2007	Authorisation by District	¿?	Concession by ANA or Territorial Delegation	
Regulation – 2010	Authorisation by District			Concession by ANA or Watershed Organisation

<i>Market orientation</i>	<i>Produce not intended for industrial market</i>	<i>Produce intended for industrial market</i>
Law 620	<i>Criterion not used</i>	
Regulation – 2007	<i>Criterion not used</i>	
Regulation – 2010	Depends on farm size	Concession by ANA even if farm size < 70 ha


Number of farms by irrigation type, by department

Area (ha) by irrigation type, by department




While the geographical distribution concessions does not mirror distribution of farms with irrigation^a

Number of concessions (since 2011) for irrigation




Number of farms (by farm size) with irrigation




^a This applies for farms > 70 ha as well as for all farms, Pearson and Spearman's rho

The ... geographical distribution concessions does mirror the distribution of irrigated area^a

Number of concessions (since 2011) for irrigation



Irrigated area (ha)



^a Pearson $p < 0.01$ and Spearman's rho $p < 0.05$.

The effects of partially implemented water governance reform: Achieving irrigation water security for all and effective water governance or legitimising dispossession?

<i>Farm size</i>	<i>< 3 ha</i>	<i>< 20 ha</i>	<i>20-70 ha</i>	<i>> 70 ha</i>
Regulation – 2010	Authorisation by District			Concession by ANA or Watershed Organisation
Number of EAs with irrigation	3430	4967	2036	1166
Number of permits	None formalised <i>(due to the absence of agreement with district administration)</i>			108 (max 9%)
Estimated water use (m ³ /year, based on Cenagro 2011 and AQUASTAT)	58.484.280	57.827.835	66.682.532	420.929.112
Volume of water concessioned (m ³ /year)				380.103.620 (90%)

Left in a legal limbo?

Securing formally sanctioned rights but blocking law on tariffs

RESOLUCIONES 2013

REGISTRÓ
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AGUA

(RPNDA)

TOMO I

*Water governance reform
in the context of
inequality and weak administrative and
regulatory capacity
risks
deepening inequality with respect to
formally sanctioned irrigation water rights
and thus economic opportunities more broadly*



IXMATI
Instituto Centroamericano para el
Desarrollo de Capacidades Humanas



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Thank you for listening!

For more information: hmr@diis.dk